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**THE MODERN EUROPEAN TRIPARTITE VISION OF THE SOCIAL  
CONTRACT AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY:  
HOBBS, LOCKE, AND ROUSSEAU**

**Abstract.** Western philosophy of the XVI - XVII centuries developed during economic growth and the increase of scientific knowledge. The theory of knowledge and natural sciences began to develop rapidly. Following F. Bacon Thomas Goos, and John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau introduced progressive ideas aimed at changing society and thinking. The change in social production was accompanied by a change in public relations. Interpersonal relations were built on the basis of a social contract. And so one of the important problems for the study became the problem of the social contract.

T. Gobbs, J. Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau tried to uncover the essence of civil society through the prism of their vision. Each of them put forward original ideas aimed at improving the people's way of life. In this article, we will undertake a comparative analysis of the teachings of great thinkers about society and civil society.

**Key words:** T. Gobbs, J. Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, social production, scientific knowledge, economic growth, life of people

***Introduction***

One of the major foundations of a number of Western political philosophies is the notion of the "social contract"- a concept unfamiliar to many non-Western readers who have been brought up in a communitarian -collective type of society, where a person is viewed as a dimension of a tribe or of a larger community. Indeed, Plato's Utopia in the Republic may be regarded as the genesis of communitarian views, Nevertheless, the political and economic philosophies of the so-called age of reason/ age of enlightenment -from the 16<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> Century, such as "the laissez faire perspective of capitalism" and the "Divine attribute of property rights," dominate much of the agenda of the conservative thinkers of the 20<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>st</sup> Century. Accordingly, comprehending the ethos of the "social contract" model is essential for understanding the foundations of Western thought.

Let us focus on the modern social contract teachings of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788). Crucial to understanding the intellectual influences upon these individuals that essentially shape their political teachings is to recognize that all three were Reformation Christian and Enlightenment thinkers. Hobbes's father was an English vicar. Both Locke's parents were Puritans. And Jean-Jacques was born into a Calvinist family in Geneva, Switzerland. While he converted later, as a teenager for a short time to Catholicism, he re-converted to Calvinism in his early forties.

Following Reformed Protestantism and, to some extent, Enlightenment ideas, these thinkers rejected the centuries-old claim that secondary causes (mind-independent beings) exist that contain intrinsic causal principles of action. Instead, all adopted the teaching that God is the only proximate cause, the prime mover of everything in the physical universe, moving all other things by imposing "laws" on them as instruments of Divine causation. And, following an epistemological principle that all Enlightenment thinkers had inherited from René Descartes, they maintained that prior to possessing science (which can only be had by engaging in a methodological criticism of all prior claims to possess knowledge), no truth exists: human beings have no knowledge.

### ***Main part***

When transferred into political theory, this principle of pre-scientific, pre-Enlightenment, absolute skepticism as part of the natural ability to possess knowledge led these thinkers to maintain two principles that acted as proximate principles in the development of their social-contract political teachings: 1) instead of referring to a secondary cause existing within physical beings, "nature" now chiefly refers to a pre-historic time of human existence, a pre-scientific age in which human beings lived without Enlightened reason, knowledge, and truth; and 2) prior to possessing Enlightenment reason, some knowledge, no individual human being could have been able to engage in political self-government; 3) before any human being can engage in competent political debate, that person must subject his or her un-Enlightened political "beliefs" (ignorance) to an Enlightenment critique.

Hobbes engages in this epistemological critique by attacking reliability of the human sense faculties to be able precisely to apprehend the natures of physical things. His social contract political thought applies a mechanical "philosophy" like that of Sir Francis Bacon externally to constrain the overextension of un-Enlightened beliefs within the range of scientific reason.

Despite the supposed radical difference between the subjective idealism of Descartes and the empiricism of Hobbes and Locke, their teachings about the nature of knowledge grow out of identical, Cartesian noetic assumptions. Both of them and Rousseau are essentially epistemological Cartesians; and all Cartesian thinkers are secularized Christian fundamentalists. In their "systems" knowledge is always the result of science and science always results from illumination, Enlightenment, of the will or "passionate emotion," which results in transforming what had previously been unknowing restless reason (the wandering imagination) into pure reason.

Not surprising, then, for Hobbes to maintain that, while all knowledge originates in sensation, sensation is a likeness, or imaginary activity that we recognize by feeling: an act of the human imagination that results from contrary motions caused by the pressure matter exerts upon an organ. Hobbes claims that outside the human body, matter and motion stimulate bodily organs. He considers body to be that to which quantity belongs and motion to be a succession of parts relative to place. By its pressure on an organ, motion generates counter-motions in an organ, which constitute sense images. Hence, what we sense is initial pressure on an organ, a feeling or image, not something external to us.

In his *Elements of Philosophy*, like Augustine, Hobbes calls these counter-motions that we sense "endeavors." By this he means slight starts (what Augustine would call "seeds" or "rationes seminales") of motion not visible to the sense of sight, but that we "feel" by the sense of touch, the first sensation of the imagination. Consequently, he holds that sensation is the feeling generated in the original act of the imagination by counter-motions occasioned within an organ by outside pressure. As such, sensing is a synthetic imaginary act produced by the mixing of contrary motions. These counter-motions generate the feeling of a likeness, or dream-like act (what Descartes would call "thinking," not "pure reason").

Because they are not clear and distinct sensations, Hobbes does not consider such obscure feelings (analogous to primitive acts of faith) to be knowledge. To become knowledge, such obscure feelings must become Enlightened through the standard Augustinian noetic progression from imagination, through memory and experience, to understanding.

According to Hobbes, imagination and memory are different species of "decaying sense" (apparently of some original sense of touch, of pressure on an organ). Imagination consists in our decaying sense of an image (apparently of the pressure). Memory is the decaying sense of the feeling (apparently of the original sense of the touch generated by pressure on an organ) that the image's appearance generates in us. Experience, in turn, is much memory, or memory of many things. Lastly, understanding is transcendental imagination, imagination elevated in us "by words or other voluntary signs."

In both brute animals and human beings, Hobbes claims that what we sense first appears in the imagination does so in an orderly, successive, fashion, resembling the quasi-historical, mnemonic, succession in which they first appeared in the imagination, thereby becoming a train of sensations, feelings, or "thoughts." Such thoughts can appear as regulated or unregulated. A regulated train of thoughts contains some passionate thought within it that governs and directs the other thoughts that follow it. The presence of this passionate thought within a train of thoughts strengthens the train's order by preventing the train of thoughts from wandering.

In addition, Hobbes maintains that two kinds of regulated trains of thoughts exist: [Hobbes, Thomas. 1949] one common to brute animals and human beings in which both seek causes from an imagined effect; and [Hobbes, Thomas 1928 ] one uniquely human, more providential, premeditative, and potentially clear and distinct.

We start this second train of thoughts by [Hobbes, Thomas. 1949] imagining anything we please; then feeling all the possible effects it is able to cause; and [Hobbes, Thomas. 1949] imagining how we can use it when we have it.

Hobbes calls this second regulated train of thoughts "seeking" and, like Augustine, the "faculty of invention." In a way identical to St. Augustine's *Confessions*, Hobbes distinguishes two types of seeking or faculty of invention: (1) remembrance, or calling to mind; and (2) prudence, providence, or foresight.

Just as "a spaniel ranges a field till he finds a scent," Hobbes claims that remembrance scans past images, seeks with intent, passionate thought. In so doing it starts to exercise an act that in human beings is prudence, which Hobbes understands to be a guessing about the future that uses signs. Like St. Augustine, he refers to "signs" as what many of us today would call "hints," "clues," or "premeditations." As Hobbes states: "The best prophet is naturally the best guesser, and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at; for he has the most signs to guess by."

At best, he considers signs to be occasional causes of knowledge, marks that call to mind order, succession, and, with them memory and anticipation. Like Augustine, he thinks that the ability to identify things by signs moves thought from experience to understanding. Hobbes claims that this movement starts when signs remind us of our actual knowledge or urge us to investigate what we do not know. The more experience we have, the more memory we have. The more memory we have, the more succession we have witnessed in our trains of thought, the better we identify signs, and the more we grow in prudence. Hence, for Hobbes, prudence, the ability to identify things by signs, is the chief principle that transforms human thought from experience to understanding.

Like Augustine, Hobbes also thinks we have an internal teacher to which we listen as the first light hidden in the recesses of our memory. St. Augustine considers this teacher to be Christ, the Truth. In contrast, Hobbes considers this teacher to be the social act of speech, "the most noble and profitable invention of all other," the cause of all understanding.

Hobbes maintains that the act of speech "transfers our mental discourse into verbal; or the train of our thoughts into a train of words." In so doing, the act of speech serves the practical function of transforming what had been a private, regulated train of thoughts and signs from being unclear and indistinct into clear and distinct ideas, Enlightened ideas, prudential and scientific ideas: an invention of a social will chiefly designed to convey social feelings, not a discovery of reason chiefly designed to share knowledge of things.

Hobbes chiefly considers words to be tools for social action: essentially political tools. In speech, we do not name things for ourselves. We transfer our private images, private feelings, into social feelings. In this way, what had been unclear and indistinct ideas become clear and distinct, universal principles for social action, universal social feelings. By speech, through use of commonly agreed-upon signs, we make public, convey to others, what had been private feelings, and commonly agree to name things in a definite way through an act of social will.

When we human beings enter into a social contract, socially agree, to name our feelings as social feelings, we create a unity of will, for a blueprint, system, or method, of action (practical reason) that constitutes the rule or measure for understanding the natures of things. In short, we establish a political common will as a social rule of prudence (right reason), belonging to no individual person, but to the State as artificial man.

Hence, Hobbes says that "truth consisteth in the right ordering of names (that is, right, prudential, ordering of our social feelings) in our affirmations" and understanding is "conception (that is, clear and distinct ideas) caused by speech." Both understanding and truth result from a social will and socially-accepted mode of naming. that synthesizes speech and social will-power into right and true philosophy: the conflation of science and prudence.

No surprise, then, that Hobbes considers the greatest cause of human, and especially philosophical, error to be failure to agree upon a uniform method of action (that is, failure to reach political consensus [or social contract agreement] of will, about right definition). For him this amounts to failure to agree upon a uniform method of political action. Consequently, about absurd conclusions considered in general, Hobbes states,

"The first cause of absurd conclusions I ascribe to want of method, in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions, that is from settled signification of words: as if they could cast account without knowing the value of numeral words, one, tow, and three."

He accuses philosophers of being guilty of this un-methodological practice (that is, failing to apply the Hobbesian version of epistemological critique to show our individual incompetence to engage in enlightened self-definition and self-rule). Prior to this

"Hobbesian" critique, supposedly sense and imagination are wandering, unclear and indistinct trains of thought. Social contract agreement constitutes the first use of speech, right definition of names, for social utility, real prudence, through which we acquire science. All falsehood, on the other hand, Hobbes says, is found in the first abuse of speech, in wrong, or no definitions. Supposedly, those who value words on the authority of an Aristotle, Marcus Tullius Cicero, or Aquinas follow this approach.

While the social contract teaching of Locke appears to be less pessimistic and totalitarian than that of Hobbes, it suffers from the same secularized Augustinian noetic principles as that of all Enlightenment thinkers. Like Bacon and Hobbes, Locke (1) makes feelings, not mentally-independent beings, the formal objects of knowledge; (2) reduces knowledge to clear and distinct perceptions, feelings; and (3) establishes the clarity and distinctness of a perception, feeling, from the light of the mind stabilized by enthusiasm of the human will: sense intuition. Like Descartes and Hobbes, Locke considers truth to lie in a relationship between the human mind and will in which the human will stabilizes restless reason's inclination to wander so that it can view in a state of rest perceptions that appear to the mind.

Hence, he says that knowledge consists in a view that the human mind has of its own ideas. Locke denies the ability to know things considered in themselves. Like Hobbes, all he knows is the way he feels about things. His will plays a crucial role in making this feeling clear and distinct.

He considers will to be simply a power (in the sense of an act) of the mind to attend or not attend to an idea in the mind or a motion in the body. Somewhat similar to Descartes, he maintains that the inability of the mind to divorce its attention from an idea causes that idea's certainty, makes it clear and distinct. Hence, he calls the view he has of his own ideas under the influence of his will the greatest light and certainty of which we are capable.

To support his claim, Locke notes the difference in clarity of human knowledge in our two ways of thinking (1) intuitive and immediate and (2) demonstrative and mediate. He calls "intuitive" our mind's immediate ability to perceive, without the need to prove or examine, or have a third idea intervene, the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas. He says this kind of knowledge resembles bright sunshine that forces us to perceive it. Its presence fills us with its clear light with such intensity of greatness that we have no opportunity to hesitate, doubt, or examine. He adds that the evidence and certainty of all human knowledge depends upon this intuition. He thinks that none of us is capable of greater certainty than knowing that an idea as we perceive it is as we perceive it to be, and that two ideas we perceive to be different are different.

Locke maintains that this intuition is so overpowering that no human being could find, imagine, or require a certainty greater than it produces. He claims that human frailty is incapable of knowledge more clear and certain than this. Indeed, certainty and

knowledge depend so much on intuitive perception and the enthusiasm of the will that we need to assume these to make all the connections in demonstrative and mediate knowledge.

Among other reasons, Locke's noetic provides a great segue into his social contract teaching because it makes evident the central role that individual will plays in Locke's teaching considered as a whole. For Locke, individual will subject to no higher authority but that of God, constitutes enlightened will. As Locke tells us in his "Second Essay" Concerning Civil Government, if we want to understand political power correctly and describe it from its principle, we need to consider that the state of human nature into which we are all born is one of (1) perfect freedom in the order of actions to dispose of our possessions and persons as we "think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature (that is, within the moral restrictions that God places on us as "His property"), without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man; and (2) perfect equality in which "all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures being of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above the other, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

A chief problem with man's state of Nature Locke describes it is at least threefold: in it, (1) individual human beings have no individual nature; (2) the freedom contained there is anarchic; and (3) despite claims sometimes made to the contrary, because this freedom is anarchic, this state of Nature is essentially what Locke describes as a state of war, not of peace.

Regarding point (1), as Locke describes us; each individual human being is an individual precisely as being in no way different from any other member of the human species. On the contrary, however, creatures that are of the same species and rank are exactly the same individual (one individual, not two individuals, not individually different). Individual differences involve beings of the same species and of different, unequal, rank. Human beings that are totally equal in freedom and faculties are identical, in no way different, are one and the same individual being. Regarding points (2) and (3), while Locke considered the state of Nature and the state of war to be conceptually distinct, in reality, he identified the state of Nature (a state of anarchy, self-sovereignty, one in which "everyone has the Executive power of the law of Nature") to be identical to a state of war (a state in which each person is "absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody").

Hence, in answer to what he calls "an often asked . . . mighty objection, where are, or ever were, there any men in such a state of Nature?", Locke responds, "Since all princes and rulers of 'independent' (that is, sovereign) governments throughout the world are in a state of Nature, it is plain the world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men in that state."

To sum up, in the state of Nature, Locke maintains that Natural Law (Divine Reason as rule [Divine Will]) inclines all human beings to (1) be self-sovereigns who, like every other human being, can only know his or her own individual feelings; (2) have a natural desire for self-preservation, which cannot be perfectly had without the

possession of property (which no individual is competent peacefully to secure in the state of Nature); 3) judge that all human beings, inside the state of Nature and in civil society, are equally incompetent when self-rule is involved; (4) want to be loved by our equals in Nature (people as equally incompetent as we are in self-rule), as much as possible; (5) to submit on this Earth to rule by no Earthly authority higher than ourselves; (6) escape the anarchic condition of the state of Nature by giving individual consent to leave this state and make ourselves members of a political society in which we submit to rule by a corporate political will that Locke calls a Legislature.

In short, due to the evidently precarious condition in the state of Nature in which we are all evidently equally incompetent as individuals to engage in self-rule, Locke thinks that Natural Law (the Will of God) inclines us freely to consent to enter civil society by freely agreeing to accept common rule under the authority of a corporate legislative will.

In entering civil society through social contract to protect the property rights whereby we secure our individual liberty and personal peace, Locke does not think we totally escape from the condition of political incompetence that essentially exists in the state of Nature. Because individual human beings always remain incompetent to engage in self-rule, Locke thinks that submission to majority rule (public will) enlightened by Natural Law (God's Will) is the only just remedy. Such rule is only possible in the form of society in which rule of the Legislature (public will) subordinated to the law of Nature is the supreme authority. Every other form of political rule, such as that of Hobbes's Leviathan, in which the legislative, executive, and judicial powers coincide, or absolute monarchies, he considers to be essentially unjust.

Turning, lastly, to the social contract teaching of Rousseau, once again, an easy way to comprehend this teaching is by contextualizing it within the noetic and secularized Christian theological principles that proximately generate it. Like Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau essentially accepts Descartes's teaching that philosophy/science consists in a "system of clear and distinct ideas" (or feelings/perceptions, as Hobbes and Locke consider them). Like Hobbes and Locke, he disagrees that this system of enlightened ideas has been innately buried by God in the minds of all human beings, but he rejects the mechanistically-constrained "empiricism" of Hobbes and "Enlightened intuitionism" of Locke to explain how this system of enlightened ideas comes to exist within the human mind.

While he essentially accepted Descartes' solipsism and his teaching about the nature of science, Rousseau realized that the success of Descartes' dream to join all our ideas into a unified scientific system depended upon overcoming a weakness in Descartes' "philosophy": By maintaining that only two substances exist, mind and matter, and that they cannot communicate, Descartes had introduced a fatal contradiction into his understanding of philosophy and science. He had simultaneously claimed that (1) matter is totally inactive, (2) mind (or spirit) is the only thing that acts, and (3) somehow matter causes mind to have awareness of matter's existence.

Rousseau realized that, in the real world that ordinary human beings inhabit on a daily basis, matter and mind communicate. Descartes could not explain this communication between the substances of mind, or spirit, and matter. Rousseau resigned to overcome this failure by accepting a position that Descartes had rejected: "modern philosophy's principles are essentially dualistic, animistic, and obscure."

Hence, Rousseau maintained that "only spirits are substances." He thought that only spirits exist and even "apparently inanimate beings, like stones, are animate." They are sensitive, but devoid of sensations, much as an angel would be intellectual, but not intellectual, if it were a pure intellect empty of ideas. While Rousseau accepted Descartes' claim that science is a system of clear and distinct ideas, he rejected Descartes' contention that God had given us this system simultaneously whole in a multitude of clear and distinct ideas innately buried in our mind. Instead, Rousseau maintained that God has intended this system of science to emerge from the human race through progressive self-development [what we, today, Westerners tend to call "progress"]. And, in this process, God intends humanity's true teacher to be a person of inspired, or Enlightened, faith, the singular person of strong feeling who has only nature as a teacher.

In his famous work *Emile* Rousseau articulates in detail nature's education of humanity's true teacher, rare and abstract man: *Emile*, "a child of Enlightenment and pure reason." *Emile* is this child: the *Book of Nature*, a *tabula rasa* [a blank slate] of pure feeling and spirit. *Emile* thus symbolizes pre-historic human nature, pre-historic human species prior to becoming conscious of itself: the conflation of poetic imagination, prophecy, and natural revelation, impelled by the infallible, transcendent voice of conscience, duty, to emerge out of itself, reveal itself, and become the science of clear and distinct ideas. Hence, Rousseau tells us, "*Emile* can only accept as true what is self-persuasive according to his historical order of growth."

Rousseau maintains that conscience is a way of speaking: an oracle, or voice, produced as a result of a system of human emotions (sensations of the self as a body) feeling themselves together, emerging, into a system of other, self-disclosed, individual emotions (the idea of self as spirit). Union of these two systems of emotion generates the voice we call "conscience": a voice that moves us to transport ourselves from one system into another, from a child of mechanical instinct (pre-historic human nature apparently inhabiting the universe of Sir Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke) to a moral agent, to a civic being. For Rousseau, the voice of conscience is God's voice, free speech: an act of disclosure whereby the system of nature transports itself (human nature), according to a mental trinity, beyond a more primitive mechanical system to a social and, finally, political system. Conscience does this by changing the way we talk (just as a male's voice changes as he enters adolescence) as we move from the lower stage to the higher.

At the mechanical stage of human instinct, which (knowingly or not) appears to correspond to the first stage of Plato's *Divided Line of Learning* and Hobbes's and Locke's man in the state of Nature), Rousseau thinks that God's voice (conscience) speaks through the mechanical voice of human instinct, human nature viewed as a dumb animal, or machine. At the moral stage of educational development (which analogously corresponds to the second stage of Plato's *Divided Line*), God's voice still speaks through the *Book of Nature*. But the *Book of Nature* is humanity emerged toward the first, primitive stage of Enlightenment reason, not the *Book of Mechanical Human Instinct*. At this point, the system of enlightened ideas enables God for the first time in human history, to utter his voice, and make it heard by the human spirit, not just by the body. That is, human beings get a taste of spirit, of freedom!

Conscience in the proper sense cannot exist prior to the existence of knowledge and reason. Since human beings do not reach this stage of knowledge and reason until they achieve the civic stage of complete Enlightenment, Rousseau maintains that, strictly speaking, in the past (and apparently outside Western culture before the eighteenth century), human beings had no conscience and could not have been moral agents. (This analogously corresponds to the third and highest stage of Plato's Divided Line [nous/episteme]).

Before humanity reaches this stage, Rousseau holds that what we call "conscience" is a primitive, mechanical-like groping toward the human good. Only the Enlightened system of ideas can make conscience emerge because non-enlightened ideas (1) are obscure and indistinct and (2) cannot produce audible sound. Rousseau maintains that they generate the counterfeit noise of fanatics. Hence, prior to the Enlightenment, conscience had no voice. Consequently, not having reached adulthood, it could not freely enter into a social contract with other enlightened wills to join into a General Will whereby it could engage in Enlightened self-rule: "the State."

This General Will is the Enlightened Social Will of people whose emotions have become thoroughly-educated to possess sincere, tolerant feelings, and, thereby, become science. It is not to be confused with majority will. It can be participated in by a minority if the minority is constituted of those individuals whose emotions have been enlightened to be sincere, tolerant, and accepting of all differences existing among human beings. Considered as such, it exists in no individual, is an abstraction to which all individuals must submit as the form of rule so that individual human beings can consider ourselves to be self-sovereigns who submit on this Earth to rule by no Earthly authority higher than ourselves.

### ***Conclusions about the significance of the teachings of Goebess, Locke and Rousseau***

Despite the fact that the social contract teachings of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau contain many truths about human nature and civil society from which human beings can learn much, these teachings contain serious flaws dangerous to any political order considering to imitate them as models of truth. A chief flaw in them is that, while generally presenting themselves as unbiased philosophical and scientific teachings, the underlying noetic out of which they essentially grow as from approximate first principle is a secularized Christian theology more concerned about defending fideistic religious truths about human nature and political life than about getting at the truth of things. In so doing, all three thinkers naively reduce the essence of prudential reason to political fictions like the Leviathan, Legislative Will, or General Will- A most foolish political act.

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**Редпат Питер (США, Коннектикут)**

## **Современное европейское трехстороннее видение социального договора и гражданского общества: Гоббс, Локк и Руссо**

**Аннотация.** Западная философия XVI - XVII веков развивалась в условиях экономического подъема и роста научного знания. Бурно стала развиваться теория познание и естествознание. Вслед за Ф.Бэконом такие философы как Томас Гоббс, Джон Локк, Жан-Жак Руссо выдвигали прогрессивные идеи направленные на изменение общества и мышления. Ибо, с изменением общественного производства изменилось и общественные отношения. Межличностные отношения встраивались на основе социального договора. И поэтому одним из важных проблем для исследования стала проблема социального договора.

Т.Гоббс, Дж.Локк и Жан-Жак Руссо через призму своего видения пытались раскрыть сущность гражданского общества. Каждый из них выдвигал оригинальные идеи направленные на улучшение образа жизни людей. В данной статье автор попытался провести сравнительный анализ учений великих мыслителей об обществе и гражданском обществе.

**Ключевые слова:** Т.Гоббс, Дж.Локк, Жан-Жак Руссо, гражданское общество, протестантизм, католицизм, западная философия политики, межличностные отношения.

**Редпат Питер (АҚШ, Коннектикут)**

## **Ижтимоий шартнома ва фуқаролик жамиятини замонавий европадаги уч томонлама талқини**

**Аннотация.** XVI - XVII аср фарб фалсафаси иқтисодий юксалиш ва илмий билим ўсиши шароитида ривожланди. Бу даврда билиш назарияси ва табиатшунослик ривож топди. Ф.Бэкон изидан Томас Гоббс, Джон Локк, Жан-Жак Руссо кабилар жамият ва тафаккурни ўзгартиришга оид илғор ғояларни илгари сурганлар. Бу даврда ижтимоий ишлаб чиқаришнинг ўзгариши билан ижтимоий муносабатлар ҳам ўзгарган. Шахслараро муносабатлар ижтимоий шартномага асосида қурила бошлаган. Шу боис ижтимоий шартнома тадқиқотнинг муҳим муаммоларидан бирига айланган.

Т.Гоббс, Дж.Локк ва Жан-Жак Руссо ўз дунёқараши нуқтаи - назаридан фуқаролик жамиятининг моҳиятини очиб беришга ҳаракат қилганлар. Уларнинг ҳар бири одамлар ҳаётини ўзгартиришга йўналтирилган ноёб ғояларни илгари сурган. Шу боис, ушбу мақолада буюк мутафаккирларнинг жамият ва фуқаролик жамияти ҳақидаги таълимотларини қиёсий таҳлил этишга ҳаракат қилинган.

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